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Abstract
The relationship between international trade and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) is one of the main features of globalization. In this paper
we investigate the effects of FDI on trade from a network perspective,
since FDI takes not only direct but also indirect channels from origin to
destination countries because of firms’ incentive to reduce tax burden,
to minimize coordination costs, and to break barriers to market entry.
We use a unique data set of international corporate control as a measure
of stock FDI to construct a corporate control network (CCN) where the
nodes are the countries and the edges are the corporate control relation-
ships. Based on the CCN, the network measures, i.e., the shortest path
length and the communicability, are computed to capture the indirect
channel of FDI. Empirically we find that corporate control has a positive
effect on trade both directly and indirectly. The result is robust with dif-
ferent specifications and estimation strategies. Hence, our paper provides
strong empirical evidence of the indirect effects of FDI on trade. More-
over, we identify a number of interplaying factors such as regional trade
agreements and the region of Asia. We also find that the indirect effects
are more pronounced for manufacturing sectors than for primary sectors
such as oil extraction and agriculture.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI),
which is one of the main features of globalization, is complex and it is not limited
to the issue of whether they are complementary1 or not (Fontagne´, 1999).
Previous studies on the effects of FDI on trade are by and large confined to a
two-country setting, where bilateral trade is solely determined by the character-
istics of the two countries considered. However, the empirical tests based on the
two-country setting have concluded with mixed results. For example, relying
on a cross-sectional firm survey data set from the 1970s in the United States,
Lipsey and Weiss (1984) find that a US firm’s outward FDI to a foreign area is
positively associated with its exports to that foreign area. Based on a panel of
China’s bilateral data with 19 foreign areas during 1984-1998, Liu et al. (2001)
also show that the inward FDI from a foreign area to China induces China’s
exports to that foreign area. Conversely, Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998) find
a negative relationship between Japanese electronics firms’ exports to Europe
and their investment in Europe in the late 1980s when Europe adopted a strict
antidumping policy. They also find that more trade is created if the investment
is related to global value chains (GVCs). Moreover, Blonigen (2001) finds a
mixed relationship between affiliate production and exports of Japanese auto-
mobile products in the United States from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.
Finally, Amiti and Wakelin (2003) run a gravity model for every year in a panel
of bilateral data between 36 countries during 1986-1994 and find that FDI has
a positive (or negative) effect on trade when countries are different (or similar)
in terms of factor endowments and when trade costs are low (or high).
Our paper investigates the effects of FDI on trade beyond the two-country
setting. Before examining its effects on bilateral trade, we quantify FDI from
a network perspective and consider both the direct and indirect channels of
FDI. The indirect channels of FDI can be explained by firms’ cost-minimization
strategies. Figure 1 shows an imaginary three-country example where country
a intends to conduct outward FDI to country c. The costs of doing so directly
is τdira,c and indirectly via country b is τ
indir
a,c , which is a combination of τ
dir
a,b and
τdirb,c .
2 Note that it is possible that τ indira,c < τ
dir
a,c and country a prefers indirect
FDI if this is the case. Below we highlight some concrete examples of costs that
firms may take into consideration when undertaking indirect FDI.
First, firms may prefer indirect FDI so as to reduce their tax burden. Due to
the varying availability of tax and investment treaties across countries, a parent
company may locate an affiliate in an intermediate country to control another
affiliate in the final destination country so as to receive the most favorable tax
and investment treatment in the host countries by profit shifting (Be´nassy-Que´re´
et al., 2005; Gumpert et al.; Hines and Rice, 1994; Van’t Riet et al., 2014). For
example, as a well-connected country in terms of tax and investment treaties, the
Netherlands is the world’s largest pass-through country for approximately 1600
billion euros of FDI in 2009 (Weyzig, 2013). Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010)
also find that in 2012 about 15 percent of outbound German FDI affiliates
1The reasoning behind is that the bilateral trade will be decreased if the bilateral FDI is
horizontal or will be increased if the bilateral FDI is vertical (Markusen, 1997, 2004; Markusen
and Maskus, 2003).
2For simplicity, we only consider a single intermediate country b. But in principle, the
number of intermediate countries can be greater than 1.
2
Figure 1: Direct and indirect costs.
are held via an intermediate firm in a third country, with the Netherlands as
the most important location of the so-called conduit entities. Other famous
examples include the FDI “round-tripping” through Hong Kong to China and
through Mauritius to India (Wei, 2005).
Second, another driver of indirect FDI is to reduce coordination costs. That
is, a parent company may locate an affiliate in a intermediate foreign country if it
is geographically, politically, or culturally closer to the final destination country
so as to achieve more effective coordination (Kalotay, 2012). For example,
Russia indirectly invests in Central and Eastern European countries through
Cyprus, taking advantage of the latter’s accession in the European Union (Pelto
et al., 2004). Note that this driver may, to some extent, overlap with the above
driver of tax and investment treaties. The fact that Hong Kong and Mauritius
serve as the gateways of inward FDI to China and India respectively is also due
to the geographical and cultural closeness.
Third, indirect FDI can be a dynamic process and can be considered as
a growth strategy to break barriers to market entry. In practice, facing high
startup costs if directly holding an affiliate in the final destination country,
multinational companies often divide a target region into several clusters of
countries and pursue a regional management structure, where regional manage-
ment centers are established first with strategic and operational roles in each
cluster (Amann et al., 2014). Moreover, FDI can be a consequence of experi-
ence accumulated and can be conceived as a sequential process when crossing
multiple country borders (Kogut, 1983).
Our paper highlights the importance of indirect effects and it is therefore
related to the recent literature of FDI and trade investigating the third-country
effects (Baltagi et al., 2007; Blonigen et al., 2007; Garretsen and Peeters, 2009).
Besides the simple dichotomy of horizontal and vertical FDI, the mixed nature
of FDI has been noted in the literature and new terms such as “complex FDI”
and “networked FDI” have been created to account for more structured forms
of FDI such as export platforms and production networks (Baldwin and Okubo,
2014; Ekholm et al., 2007; Yeaple, 2003). However, our paper differs from these
studies in at least two aspects. First, while they study the determinants of FDI,
we are interested in the consequences of FDI on trade.3 Second, to capture the
3Even more recently, (Park and Park, 2015) study the effects of FDI on trade by considering
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third-country effects, they use spatial econometrics whereas we use the tools of
network analysis.4
To take into account both the direct and indirect channels of FDI, we use a
unique data set of international corporate control (as a measure of stock FDI)
covering almost all countries over the world, while previous results are often
based on a small sample of countries or case studies due to the paucity of FDI
data.
Furthermore, we construct a corporate control network where the nodes
are the countries and the edges (both directed and weighted) are the corporate
control relationships. Based on the corporate control network, the shortest path
length (which can be either direct or indirect) and the communicability (which
is an overall measure of “communication” between nodes) between each pair
of countries are computed. The shortest path length (or the communicability)
complements (or substitutes) the direct corporate control intensity and together
they provide a more complete accounting of the effects of FDI on trade.
Then we find, using the Heckman two-stage (H2S) gravity model, a posi-
tive effect of FDI on trade both for the direct corporate control intensity and
the indirect measures, i.e., the shortest path length and the communicability.
Therefore our paper provides strong empirical evidence of the importance of
indirect effects of FDI on trade. We also identify a number of interplaying fac-
tors, including regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the region of Asia. We
also find that, compared with primary sectors such as oil extraction and agri-
culture, manufacturing sectors have more pronounced indirect effects of FDI on
trade.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces
FDI and trade networks and describes the network measures of indirect effects;
Section 3 describes our data set and provides some exploratory analysis; Sec-
tion 4 specifies our econometric methodology while Section 5 presents our main
results; finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Networks of FDI and Trade
2.1 Global Systems as Networks
There is a significant body of literature developed recently in studying economic
phenomena from a network perspective. For example, economic systems such
as international trade (De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011; Fagiolo et al., 2009;
Frankel and Rose, 2002; Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2005; Glick and Rose, 2002;
Reyes et al., 2014; Serrano and Boguna´, 2003) and corporate control (Altomonte
and Rungi, 2013; Head and Ries, 2008; Vitali et al., 2011) can be considered as
networks and their network properties can be used to understand other economic
variables (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2014; Ferrier et al., 2016; Riccaboni et al.,
2012; Schiavo et al., 2010; Sgrignoli et al., 2015).
For the world system of either trade or corporate control, we can construct a
network, where we identify countries as nodes and interaction channels between
the third-country effects. They use spatial econometrics and focus on the inward FDI to China,
whereas we use network analysis and a cross-country data set.
4In fact, we perform a spatial econometrics exercise with our data set and find a significant
third-country effect, which motivates us to study the indirect effects of FDI on trade from a
network perspective. The spatial econometrics result is available upon request.
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Figure 2: Direct and indirect paths.
them as edges. For simplicity, we call them the world trade web (WTW) and
the corporate control network (CCN) respectively. As a result, we have both
networks composed of n nodes (countries). The two networks are based on
two kinds of weighted directed edges, i.e., two n × n adjacency matrices, one
corresponding to trade flows (T ) and the other to corporate control links (C).
The generic element of T (or C) represents the value of exports Tij (or the
number of corporate control ties Cij) from country i to country j.
2.2 Network Measures of Indirect Effects
As discussed above, factors such as GVCs, tax and investment treaties, and
corporate strategies, allow the indirect effects of FDI on trade between countries.
To capture the indirect effects of FDI on trade, we use two types of network
measures based on the CCN. One is the shortest path length (Brandes, 2001;
Newman, 2001; Opsahl et al., 2010). Recall that Cij is the edge weight from
country i to country j on the CCN. Define the direct path length from i to j as
P dirij =
1
Cαij
, where α ≥ 0. The indirect path length from i to j is then computed
by adding up the direct path lengths from i to j:
P indirij = P
dir
ih + · · ·+ P dirgj =
1
Cαih
+ · · ·+ 1
Cαgj
(1)
where α ≥ 0 and h, . . . , g are the intermediate countries between i and j. We
follow (Ferrier et al., 2016) and choose α = 1 as our benchmark5.
In the same spirit of Figure 1, Figure 2 shows the difference between the
direct and indirect path lengths in a three-country example. Note that the
indirect path P indira,c may be shorter than the direct path P
dir
a,c according to
Equation 1.6
Finally, let Pindirij be the set of all possible indirect paths from i to j, the
shortest path length from i to j is defined as:
splij = min
{
P dirij ,P
indir
ij
}
(2)
5We also discount the importance of indirect links with respect to direct ones by choosing
α = 0.5 and the main regression results stay the same. See Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix.
6Again, for simplicity, we only consider a single intermediate country b. But as shown in
Equation 1, the number of intermediate countries can be greater than 1.
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Note that P dirij may not exist from i to j and that there may be no paths
from i to j at all (in this case splij =∞ and we treat it as a missing value).
The other network measure to capture the indirect effects is the communica-
bility, which takes into account not only the shortest path but also all the other
walks that connect one node to another (Estrada and Hatano, 2008).
Let A be the adjacency matrix of an undirected and unweighted network and
Aij = Aji equals 1 if there is an edge between i and j and otherwise equals 0. A
well-known property of A is that the (i, j) entry of the sth power of A, (As)ij ,
returns the number of walks of length s starting at i and ending at j. A walk
of length s is defined as a sequence of nodes v0, v1, . . . , vs−1, vs such that, for
each i = 1, 2, . . . , s, a link exists from vi−1 to vi. Note that the nodes involved
in a walk are not necessarily different from each other (i.e., some nodes may be
revisited).
Then the communicability is defined as:
cmbij =
∞∑
s=0
(As)ij
s!
(3)
where s is used to discount the number of walks of length s because less impor-
tance should be given to longer walks.
The eigenvalues of A in the non-increasing order λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn are also
called the spectrum of the graph. And Equation 3 can be rewritten in terms of
the graph spectrum:
cmbij =
n∑
k=1
φk(i)φk(j)e
λk (4)
where φk(i) is the ith element of the kth orthonormal eigenvector of the adja-
cency matrix associated with the eigenvalue λk.
Note that, unlike the shortest path length, the communicability is based
on an undirected and unweighted version of the original network, i.e., cmbij =
cmbji. While the shortest path may be either direct or indirect, the commu-
nicability takes into account all possible walks (including paths). As a result,
it provides a simplified but comprehensive measure of the level of “communi-
cation” between nodes. In our econometric analysis below, we use the shortest
path length as the main network measure and use the communicability as a
robustness check.
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
3.1 Data
In our empirical analysis we use corporate control data as a measure of stock
FDI. Our corporate control data is taken from the ORBIS database compiled
by Bureau Van Dijk for the year 20107. We only consider the cross-country
ownership relationships and a control is assumed if the parent company holds
the voting rights majority (50.01%) of the affiliate in another country. The data
thus indicates for each pair of countries the number of control links present
7A related work using the ORBIS database is (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013). Unlike theirs,
our data usage is restricted to the cross-country control links.
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between them for both directions. The data we end up with contains 36, 461
ultimate parent multinational firms, controlling a total of 354, 569 affiliates in
209 countries, for the year 2010. In our data, parent firms located in OECD
economies hold around 84% of all the control links, the 63% of which are still
in an OECD country. The headquarters located in European Union countries,
in particular, control 46% of all affiliates, of which roughly three quarters are
located outside the Union.
Our trade data is taken from the BACI dataset (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010),
which originates from the data reported by over 150 countries to the United
Nations Statistics Division (COMTRADE database) but also integrates new
approaches to reconcile those reports, in order to have a single consistent figure
for each bilateral flow. The version (Harmonized System 1996 or simply HS96)
we use covers more than 200 countries and 5000 products, between 1998 and
2012.
Using the two data sets together, we obtain a data set of 191 countries
(nodes) along with trade and corporate control relationships among them. Since
the only year present in both datasets is 2010, we perform a cross-sectional
analysis on that year.
We employ additional country-specific data such as real gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita (gdp) and population (pop) from the World Bank. We
also use bilateral country geographic, political, and socioeconomic data from the
CEPII GeoDist dataset (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). The latter includes infor-
mation about between-country geographical distance (dist8), contiguity (contig,
i.e., whether two countries share a border), colony relationship (colony, i.e.,
whether one of the two countries has ever been a colony of the other), whether
two countries have ever been unified (smctry), and ethnical language common-
ality (comlang, i.e., if spoken by at least 9% of population). We use the above
variables to implement the gravity model in Section 5.
3.2 Exploratory Analysis
To give an idea of how the trade and FDI networks look like, in Figure 3 we
plot the top 2.5%9 directed edges in terms of edge weight, according to the
following criteria: the edge color identifies whether the relationship is solely
in trade (blue), solely in corporate control (red), or in both (green); the edge
thickness is proportional to the log of edge weight10; and the node size and color
are proportional, respectively, to the log of population and the log of real GDP
per capita.
It is straigtforward to see that most of the significant connections are char-
acterized by both trade and corporate control (green) and the most intensive
interaction happens between Europe and the United States. Another interesting
finding is that the corporate-control-only connections (red) are primarily asso-
ciated with “tax havens” such as Bermuda and Cayman Islands.11 Therefore,
8We employ the great-circle definition of country distances. Results do not change if we
use alternative distance definitions.
9We have also checked the thresholds of 1% and 5% and they convey the same information.
10In the cases where both trade and corporate control are present (green edges), the weight
is calculated as the mean of the two after normalization.
11Other “tax havens” identified by the red links include British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong,
and Singapore. Note that there is a link between Bermuda and China and every other red
link is between “tax havens.”
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Figure 3: WTW and CCN in 2010. The figure plots the directed top 2.5% edges
by weight. Blue edges represent trade-only relations and red ones represent
corporate-control-only, while green ones indicate the presence of both. The edge
thickness is proportional to the log of edge weight. Node size is proportional to
the log of population (pop), while color (from blue to red) is proportional to the
log of real GDP per capita (gdp).
what Figure 3 suggests is that FDI and trade are strongly correlated and that
FDI has a preference over “tax havens”.
As another exploratory analysis, Figure 4 shows the log-log scatter plots of
the WTW and the CCN edge weights. Each dot is an element in the space
(Tij , Cij), i.e., the space of the two networks edge weights. The dot color is
proportional to the log of
gdpi×gdpj
distij
and the dot size is proportional to the log of
popi×popj
distij
. The rationale behind this analysis resides in the well-known empirical
success of the gravity model for FDI, but especially for trade, i.e., both goods
and investments flows are well explained by a gravity-like equation involving
country sizes (e.g., gdp and pop) and geographical distance. In its simplest
form, the gravity model of trade prescribes direct proportionality to countries’
sizes and inverse proportionality to their geographical distance, i.e.,
Fij ∝ sisj
dij
, (5)
where Fij represents the flow between country i and country j, si and sj rep-
resent their respective sizes, and dij is the geographical distance between the
two.
If the gravity rules, one should expect that most of the variation in the cloud
of points can be explained by larger country sizes and smaller distances. In our
case gdp (dot color) plays a more evident role as richer pairs of countries tend
to be located in the north-east part of the plot, whereas pop (dot size) has
less explanatory power. Furthermore, Figure 4 suggests a positive relationship
between the edge weights in the two networks, as a high level of exports is in
general associated with a high number of corporate control links.
It is also interesting to notice which the outlier edges are. We find again that
most of them are “tax havens,” where there are intense incoming and outgoing
corporate control links and relatively low flows of goods (in Figure 4 we highlight
only a few).
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Figure 4: WTW vs CCN edge weights for the aggregate level. The dot color
(blue to red) is proportional to the log of
gdpi×gdpj
distij
. The dot size is proportional
to the log of
popi×popj
distij
.
4 Econometric Specifications
As stated in Section 1, besides the direct effects of FDI on trade between coun-
tries, the indirect effects of FDI on trade are possible due to factors such as
GVCs, tax and investment treaties, and corporate strategies. Therefore, when
explaining trade, we introduce the network measures of the indirect effects. In
particular, we either complement the direct corporate control intensity with the
shortest path length or substitute it with the communicability. We do not in-
clude both the direct corporate control intensity and the communicability at
the same time because the two variables are highly correlated12 in our data
and would therefore produce biased estimations. Therefore, we only include the
communicability in the regressions to account for an overall measure of FDI
relationships between countries.
Moreover, what we expect to see is a strong correlation between corporate
control links and trade flows in the two possible ways, i.e., both when the
two relationships are in the same direction (corporate control export and trade
export, e.g., a parent company exports inputs to its foreign affiliates) and when
they happen in opposite directions (corporate control export and trade import,
e.g., a parent company imports processed inputs from its foreign affiliates). We
12The reason why they are so correlated is that the communicability takes into account
both the direct link and the indirect links and assigns the largest weight to the direct link.
See Table 2 for the correlation coefficients among the variables we used in the regressions.
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also intend to test the effects of a group of factors that may affect whether
corporate control and trade are substitutes or complements, including regional
trade agreements (RTAs) and the region of Asia.
An important feature of today’s globalized and integrated economy is the
proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). According to the WTO data,
the number of RTAs has risen from less than 100 in the early 1990s to over
300 today and more than half of the world trade is governed by at least one
RTA (Damuri, 2012; WTO, 2011). While one might be tempted to think that
trade is naturally of a global span, it is in fact very regional13. Without a
widespread harmonization of trade and investment agreements (WTO, 2013),
it is reasonable to suspect different interactions between trade and corporate
control depending on whether an RTA is in place.
Finally, another important aspect to test is the special case of Asia. As one
can observe in Figure 3, the trade relationships are particularly concentrated in
Asia. Therefore, we want to test if being in Asia has any significant effects on
trade and on the relation between corporate control and trade.
Now we turn to the econometric specifications. In the following analyses
we use the Heckman two-step (H2S) (Heckman, 1979; Helpman et al., 2008)
gravity equation to model the relation between trade and corporate control (as
a measure of stock FDI).
Since the seminal works by Linnemann (1966) and Tinbergen (1962), the
gravity model has been widely used in empirical studies on trade because of its
excellent fit with the data (Egger, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002). Moreover,
a lot of effort has been put into refining it and giving it a consistent economic
foundation (Bergstrand, 1985; Van Wincoop and Anderson, 2003). Generalizing
Equation 5 above, and applying a log transformation of both sides, we can write
the formula in a linear multivariate form:
lnFij = β0 + β1 ln si + β2 ln sj + β3 ln dij + . . .+ ij (6)
where ij is the stochastic residual term, usually assumed to be i.i.d. and
∼ N(0, σ2), and “. . .” indicates the possibility to add more regressors (e.g.,
country- or edge-specific characteristics) to the model specification.
Empirically, the size variables (si and sj) typically include GDP per capita
14
(gdp) and population (pop) while the impedance factors (dij) typically include
geographical distance (dist). Since we focus on the effects of FDI on trade,
besides the traditional variables of a gravity model, we control for both the
direct corporate control intensity (CC) and the shortest path length (spl).
The two-step sample selection estimators are used to model bilateral trade in
the presence of zero flows, as they allow us to remove the effects of the extensive
margin of trade in order to correctly estimate the intensive margin effects, in
contrast with other biased approaches which calculate coefficients that combine
both the extensive and intensive margins (Head and Mayer, 2013). Helpman
et al. (2008) also show that traditional estimates are biased and that most of
the bias is not due to selection but rather to the omission of the extensive
margin. Moreover, Linders and De Groot (2006) conclude that censored or
13The word “regional” here refers to big international economic blocks such as EU, NAFTA,
and ASEAN.
14Unlike in the previous exploratory analysis, where real GDP per capita is used, we use
nominal GDP per capita in the regressions as the dependent variable is in current US dollars.
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truncated regression and replacement of zero flows with arbitrary numbers are
not preferable as these approaches may yield misleading results and they rely
on ad-hoc assumptions and artificial censoring. Sample selection models, on
the other hand, allow zero flows and the size of potential trade to be explained
jointly and are proved to be the most reasonable choice.
In particular Helpman et al. (2008) provide a theoretical framework jointly
determining both the set of trading partners and their trade volumes, using
the H2S selection model (Heckman, 1979). They develop a trade model in
which firms face fixed and variable costs of exporting and productivity varies
depending on both firms and destinations. Furthermore, trade channels depend
on the profitability. Therefore for any pair of countries there may be no firm
productive enough to profitably export. As a result, the model is consistent with
zero trade flows in both directions between some countries, as well as positive,
though asymmetric, trade flows in both directions between others.
Following this literature we carry out all the econometric analyses in this pa-
per using the H2S, which involves first a probit model to estimate the probability
of a positive trade flow between any pair of countries and a second step that
estimates the log-linear specification of the gravity equation on the positive-flow
observations, with a selection correction.15
5 Results
In our baseline model we consider the logarithm16 of directed bilateral trade
flows (ln trade) as the dependent variable and the logarithm of the number of
direct corporate control links (lnCC) and the logarithm of the shortest path
length (ln spl), as a proxy of indirect FDI, as the key explanatory variables.
In addition, the model includes the logarithm of geographical distance (the
great-circle definition, ln dist), and the traditional gravity dummy variables in-
cluding contiguity (contig), colony relations (colony), whether they have ever
been unified (smcrtry), and common language (if spoken by at least 9% of the
population, comlang). Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables
used in the regressions. Note that we rescale the communicability (cmb) values
because of their large magnitude and that 90% of the shortest paths available
are indirect17.
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients among the variables used in the
regressions. Note that lnCC is correlated with both ln spl (negatively) and
ln cmb (positively). Therefore, we either control lnCC and ln spl at the same
time to account for the direct and indirect effects of FDI respectively or, as a
15Many alternative models have been introduced in the literature that employ the two-step
techniques to address the issue of zero flows. Among them the most common ones are the zero
inflated Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (ZIPPML) and the zero inflated negative bino-
mial maximum likelihood (ZINBML) as well as exponential conditional expectations (ECE),
although there has been a long debate in the literature about the appropriateness of different
models (Martin and Pham, 2015; Silva et al., 2015).
16We use the natural logarithm, although the regressions can be run with other bases such
as log10. The only difference is that dummy variables coefficients are reduced approximately
to half of the value. But all significance levels are unchanged.
17This justifies our use of the shortest path length as a measure of the indirect effects. If
most of the shortest paths are rather direct, the variable ln spl will be redundant since we
already have the direct corporate control intensity, lnCC.
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robustness check, control ln cmb only to have a comprehensive measure of the
FDI effects.
The results of the baseline models are presented in Table 3. We have three
specifications to account for FDI, lnCC only, ln spl only, or both lnCC and
ln spl.
To estimate the first step of the H2S selection model, i.e., the probability
that a dyad trade relationship exists (extensive margin), we use ln dist18 as the
explanatory variable. As expected, we find that the probability is negatively
correlated with the geographical distance between the two countries. In the
second step, all the explanatory variables’ coefficients have the expected signs
and significance, i.e., ln gdp and ln pop both have positive and significant coef-
ficients, ln dist has a negative and significant coefficient, and all the dummies
have positive and significant coefficients.19
Most importantly, we find that the number of corporate control links, lnCC,
has a positive and significant effect in explaining trade and the shortest path
length, ln spl, has a negative effect in explaining trade. That is, two countries
trade more both if they have more direct corporate control links and if they are
closer to each other by an indirect path on the CCN.20
Note that our choice of ln spl rather than spl provides an interesting interpre-
tation of the result. If all the shortest paths of the CCN are the direct ones and
when α = 1, ln spl would be simply ln 1CC = − lnCC, according to Equations
1 and 2. As a result, the coefficients estimated for either lnCC or ln spl alone
would be of the same magnitude but with the opposite sign. However, as stated
above, about 90% of the shortest paths are indirect. Therefore, by comparing
the magnitudes of the coefficients estimated between lnCC and ln spl, we learn
that the indirect effects are slightly larger than the direct ones.
We consider also the case when corporate control and trade are in different
directions. The right panel of Table 3 shows the regression result by replacing
lnCC with lnCC inv (i.e., the trade importer country controls affiliates in the
trade exporter country) and ln spl with ln spl inv. With this model specification
the absolute values of the estimated coefficients of corporate control (lnCC inv)
and of the shortest path length (ln spl inv) both increase, meaning that the
number of inverse corporate control links and the inverse shortest path length
have larger effects on trade.
As an alternative way to capture the indirect effects, we measure the differ-
ence between the shortest path and the direct path as diff = 1spl−CC, where 1spl
can be interpreted as the “potential” magnititude of FDI stock of the shortest
path, CC is the observed magnititude of FDI stock of the direct path, and diff
can be interpreted as the “net gain” of the shortest path when compared with
the direct one. Note that, if the shortest path is the direct one, diff = 0, and if
the shortest path is an indirect one, diff > 0. Therefore, by our definition above,
diff ≥ 0. The correlation coefficient between ln diff and lnCC is 0.466, which
is much lower in absolute value than that between ln spl and lnCC, -0.716 (see
Table 2).21 In Table A1, we replace ln spl with ln diff (or replace ln spl inv with
18As far as we know, a unanimous way to model the extensive margin still does not exist.
19Our results are robust to additional controls such as common religion, common colonial
ties, and landlocking effects.
20The shortest path can also be a direct one. But as stated above, 90% of time the shortest
paths are indirect.
21Similarly, the correlation coefficient between ln diff inv and lnCC has been lowered to
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ln diff inv) and rerun the baseline models and find that the coefficient of ln diff
(or ln diff inv) is positive and significant. This implies that, with other things
held constant, more trade is expected if the “net gain” of the shortest path is
larger.
A drawback of our previous analysis is that we measure the strength of FDI
between countries by counting the number of corporate control links, which may
differ from each other in terms of firm and investment sizes. We mitigate this
problem by using an alternative data source of stock FDI from the UNCTAD
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development).22 Unlike our measure,
the alternative data source has the exact magnitude23 of stock FDI in millions
of US dollars. We recompute the shortest path length variable based on the
UNCTAD data set and report the regression results24 in Table 4. As before, a
negative and significant coefficient of ln spl is estimated. Note that the UNC-
TAD data set renders much fewer observations than our previous data set does,
which explains why we prefer the number of corporate controls computed on
the firm-level ORBIS database as a proxy of stock FDI.
Furthermore, in the first column of both panels of Table 5 we introduce the
interactions of lnCC and ln spl with ln dist into our baseline specification. We
find that ln spl flips its sign after the interaction terms are introduced. Both
lnCC and ln spl have opposite signs with respect to their interaction terms.
Note that the indirect effects of FDI on trade increase with distance while the
direct effects of FDI on trade decrease with distance. Hence, it is possible to
identify the critical value of dist for which lnCC (or ln spl) starts to affect trade
negatively. To do so, we rewrite the model equation as
ln trade = β0 + β1 lnCC + β2 ln spl + β3 ln dist
+β4 lnCC ln dist+ β5 ln spl ln dist+ . . .
(7)
where, for simplicity, “. . . ” indicates other possible factors. The value of dist,
dist, we look for is the one that solves ∂ ln trade∂ lnCC = β1+β4 ln dist = 0 or
∂ ln trade
∂ ln spl =
β2 + β5 ln dist = 0.
For the first column of the left panel of Table 3, dist is about 90335 kilometers
for lnCC and is 2474 kilometers for ln spl. In the regression sample, no country
pair has distance larger than 90335 kilometers and 11.83% of the country pairs
have distances smaller than 2474 kilometers. Therefore, for the majority of
country pairs, trade benefits from corporate control relationships, both directly
and indirectly.
We also explore other factors of explaining trade. In the second column of
both panels of Table 5 we analyze the influence of regional trade agreements
(RTAs). We are interested in knowing if belonging to a common RTA fosters
trade and whether it affects the relation between trade and corporate control.
As expected, the presence of RTA (rta) has a positive and significant coeffi-
cient. However, both lnCC and ln spl have opposite signs with respect to their
0.355. The precise calculation is ln diff = ln(diff + 1) and we add 1 before taking the natural
logarithm because diff may equal 0 if the shortest path is the direct one.
22The stock FDI data set is downloaded from the UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics for
the year 2010.
23Sometimes the numbers reported by the FDI origin and host countries may be different.
In these cases, we take the average.
24We use the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) method because the self-selection
bias is absent if using the H2S method.
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interaction terms with rta, meaning that the presence of RTAs reduces the pos-
itive (both direct and indirect) effects of corporate control on trade. This result
makes intuitive sense because trade depends less on corporate control links once
an RTA, which is composed of explicit arrangements to encourage trade, enters
into force. The same result also holds for the inverse direction (the right panel).
Next we shift our attention to Asia. Some Asian countries may need special
treatment as they are active participants of GVCs (Baldwin, 2008; Zhu et al.,
2014). Therefore, we consider the 10 ASEAN countries25 plus China and add a
dummy, ASEAN + China, identifying them as trade exporters as well as the
interactions of lnCC and ln spl with ASEAN + China. The third column of
both panels of Table 5 shows the regression result. ASEAN + China has a
postive and significant coefficient in both directions while the only significant
interaction term is with lnCC and when both trade and corporate control are
in the same direction, meaning that the 11 Asian countries considered carry out
more exports than the average and export more to the countries where they
have controlled affiliates.
We also explicitly consider the heterogeneity of the indirect effects across
sectors. To test this, we exploit the sectoral information of our data set26 and
decompose it into six 2-digit NAICS (North American Industry Classification
System) sectors.27 Table 6 shows the result, where we control for both the inter-
cept effects by introducing sector dummies and the slope effects by interacting
sector dummies with the number of corporate control links (i.e., lnCC in the
second column) and the shortest path length variable (i.e., ln spl in the third
column), where the benchmark NAICS sector is 21, Mining, Quarrying, and
Oil and Gas Extraction.28 We find that, the manufacturing sectors (31-33) not
only have larger intercept effects but also, as expected, have more pronounced
indirect effects of FDI on trade, when compared with the primary sectors (11,
21, and 22). For example, the sector-specific coefficient of ln spl is insignificant
or positive for the primary sectors (e.g., −0.004 + 0.091 = 0.087 for 11) and
turns negative for the manufacturing sectors (e.g., −0.004− 0.268 = −0.272 for
31).
6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we perform a number of robustness checks. First of all, there
is an endogeneity issue that a mutual causal linkage may exist between FDI
and trade.29 Also, Both trade and FDI can be studied in a gravity model with
common determinants such as distance and colonial ties (Kleinert and Toubal,
2010). To address this issue, we specify the following simultaneous equations
model30 and run a 3SLS (three-stage least squares) regression (Mitze et al.,
25These are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
26We thank the anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to study the sectoral heterogeneity.
27They are: 11, Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting; 21, Mining, Quarrying, and
Oil and Gas Extraction; 22, Utilities; and 31-33, Manufacturing. The detailed information of
how we convert HS96 to NAICS is available upon request.
28We also run the regressions separately for every restricted sample for each sector. The
result is very similar and is available upon request.
29We thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
30We remove colony from the first equation and remove smctry from the second equation
to satisfy the identification condition.
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2010; Wooldridge, 2015):
ln trade = β0 + β1 lnCC + β2 ln spl + β3 ln gdp o+ β4 ln gdp d
+β5 ln pop o+ β6 ln pop d+ β7 ln dist
+β8contig + β9smctry + β10comlang + 
lnCC = γ0 + γ1 ln trade+ γ2 ln gdp o+ γ3 ln gdp d
+γ4 ln pop o+ γ5 ln pop d+ γ6 ln dist
+γ7contig + γ8colony + γ9comlang + υ
(8)
where the endogenous variables are ln trade and lnCC and all the other variables
are assumed to be exogenous.
The reduced form result31 is reported in Table A2. Again, the coefficient of
ln spl is significant and negative, which is in line with our previous results.
Another potential issue with our measure is that aggregating the number
of corporate control links across countries may overestimate the strength of
indirect control. For example, if some firms in country a control some affiliates
in country b and some firms in country b have some affiliates in country c, we
assume that there is an indirect control from country a to country c. However,
country a’s affiliates in country b are not necessarily the same ones controlling
the affiliates in country c. Therefore, we need to discount the importance of
indirect links with respect to direct ones. To do so, we recompute the shortest
path length with α = 0.5. As a result, 84.2% of the shortest paths are indirect,
as opposed to 90% if α = 1. However, the main regression results are still robust
with α = 0.5 (see Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix).32
As another robustness check, we run the regressions by replacing lnCC and
ln spl with the overall measure of FDI “communication” between countries, the
communicability, ln cmb. The main result stays the same and is reported in the
appendix (Table A5).
Last but not least, we also estimate the baseline models using the Poisson
pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) and the zero inflated Poisson pseudo max-
imum likelihood (ZIPPML). Results are reported in the appendix (Table A6)
and the signs of the estimated coefficients are indeed robust with respect to
different estimation methods.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the effects of FDI on trade from a network perspec-
tive. We use a unique data set of international corporate control as a measure
of stock FDI. We first construct the networks of trade (WTW) and corporate
control (CCN) and find a significant correlation between them. Most impor-
tantly, firms’ incentive to reduce tax burden, to minimize coordination costs,
and to break barriers to market entry, allows the indirect effects of FDI on trade
between countries.
Within the H2S gravity model, we either complement the direct corporate
control intensity with the shortest path length or substitute it with the com-
municability to have a comprehensive accounting of the effects of FDI on trade.
31The original form result is available upon request.
32The result of the interaction term between ASEAN + China and lnCC is not robust
with α = 0.5 (see Table A4 in the appendix).
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We find that in general corporate control (as a measure of stock FDI) has a
positive effect on trade both directly and indirectly. This result is robust with
respect to different specifications and estimation strategies, therefore provid-
ing strong empirical evidence of the indirect effects of FDI on trade. We also
identify a number of interplaying factors, including regional trade agreements
(RTAs) and the region of Asia. Moreover, we find that the indirect effects are
more pronounced for manufacturing sectors than for primary sectors such as oil
extraction and agriculture.
To extend our work, we may consider the heterogeneity of the corporate
control links in the future if more firm-level data become available. Currently
we weight the edges of the CCN simply by counting the number of corporate
control links between countries. This may be problematic if the links are of
very different importance in terms of, for example, economic size. Another
potential improvement with more firm-level information is that the real indirect
corporate control paths can be traced out if we focus on the same firms in the
intermediate countries. Finally, our work provides strong evidence that indirect
FDI is trade-promoting. However, indirect FDI comes at a price as it may be
the result of tax evasion. Therefore, the pros and cons of indirect FDI can be
properly evaluated only if more detailed firm-level information is obtained.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions.
Variable Description # of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
trade Value of trade in thousands of current USD 37,442 372,915.9 4,169,913 0 328,000,000
CC Number of corporate control links 37,442 10.17 160.97 0 20,711
gdp GDP per capita in thousands of current USD 36,477 11.79 16.92 0 88.41
pop Population 36,477 36,200,000 135,000,000 20,470 1,340,000,000
contig 1 if the two countries are contiguous 36,672 .0153 .123 0 1
comlang 1 if the two countries have a common ethnical language 36,672 .153 .360 0 1
colony 1 if the two countries have a colonial relation 36,672 .0107 .103 0 1
smctry 1 if the two countries were/are the same country 36,672 .008 .089 0 1
dist Distance, great circle formula, most important cities/agglomerations 36,672 8,075.14 4,591.68 1.047.89 19,904.45
rta 1 if the two countries have a regional trade agreement in force 35,532 .069 .253 0 1
ASEAN + China 1 if the exporter country is an ASEAN country or China 37,442 .056701 .2312735 0 1
spl Shortest path length (weighted, directed) based on the CCN 23,936 .344 .452 .00005 3.834
cmb Communicability (unweighted, undirected) based on the CCN 37,442 .265 .302 .0004 2.042
Table 2: Matrix of the pairwise correlations among the variables used in the
regressions.
ln trade lnCC lnCC inv ln gdp ln pop comlang contig smctry colony ln dist rta ln cmd ln spl ln spl inv
lnCC 0.547
lnCC inv 0.516 0.570
ln gdp 0.295 0.445 0.176
ln pop 0.413 0.174 0.138 -0.228
comlang 0.017 0.088 0.085 -0.027 -0.065
contig 0.189 0.174 0.172 0.007 0.046 0.110
smctry 0.088 0.065 0.066 -0.007 -0.019 0.104 0.311
colony 0.137 0.195 0.192 0.045 0.042 0.174 0.130 0.059
ln dist -0.266 -0.227 -0.224 -0.089 0.089 -0.087 -0.350 -0.275 -0.071
rta 0.283 0.303 0.302 0.169 -0.061 0.022 0.189 0.141 0.063 -0.555
ln cmd 0.652 0.594 0.597 0.436 0.218 -0.044 0.044 -0.020 0.086 -0.020 0.216
ln spl -0.506 -0.716 -0.434 -0.649 -0.131 -0.004 -0.051 0.000 -0.061 0.019 -0.210 -0.722
ln spl inv -0.437 -0.433 -0.717 -0.138 -0.079 -0.002 -0.049 -0.004 -0.059 0.018 -0.208 -0.728 0.446
ASEAN + China 0.156 0.000 0.041 -0.122 0.283 -0.037 -0.004 -0.016 -0.023 0.143 -0.078 0.070 -0.100 -0.038
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Table 3: Regressions for the baseline models: (1) CC only; (2) spl only; (3)
CC and spl. The left panel reports the cases where trade and CC (or spl) are
in the same direction. The right panel reports the cases where trade and CC
(or spl) are in the opposite directions. Note that the network measure of the
indirect effects is spl.
Baseline (1) Baseline (2) Baseline (3) Baseline (inv) (1) Baseline (inv) (2) Baseline (inv) (3)
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
lnCC 0.230 *** 0.103 ***
(0.024) (0.018)
lnCC inv 0.276 *** 0.127 ***
(0.023) (0.026)
ln spl -0.251 *** -0.203 ***
(0.013) (0.016)
ln spl inv -0.306 *** -0.246 ***
(0.020) (0.022)
ln gdp o 1.158 *** 0.933 *** 0.924 *** 1.190 *** 1.171 *** 1.160 ***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
ln gdp d 0.832 *** 0.817 *** 0.809 *** 0.773 *** 0.604 *** 0.594 ***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.025) (0.024)
ln pop o 1.097 *** 1.059 *** 1.047 *** 1.100 *** 1.110 *** 1.099 ***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
ln pop d 0.862 *** 0.870 *** 0.861 *** 0.845 *** 0.831 *** 0.818 ***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
contig 0.566 *** 0.429 *** 0.399 *** 0.554 *** 0.417 * 0.378 *
(0.214) (0.140) (0.139) (0.210) (0.232) (0.223)
colony 0.536 *** 0.679 *** 0.568 *** 0.501 *** 0.809 *** 0.673 ***
(0.184) (0.125) (0.126) (0.180) (0.189) (0.184)
smctry 1.083 *** 0.801 *** 0.816 *** 1.080 ** 0.767 ** 0.787 **
(0.295) (0.207) (0.205) (0.289) (0.349) (0.335)
comlang 0.837 *** 0.810 *** 0.782 *** 0.825 *** 0.835 *** 0.800 ***
(0.066) (0.047) (0.047) (0.065) (0.070) (0.067)
ln dist -2.115 *** -1.608 *** -1.543 *** -2.084 *** -2.152 *** -2.070 ***
(0.276) (0.208) (0.206) (0.270) (0.352) (0.339)
Cons. -11.694 *** -13.626 *** -13.667 *** -11.659 *** -11.547 *** -11.615 ***
(1.602) (1.133) (1.121) (1.568) (1.918) (1.843)
trade dummy (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -0.400 *** -0.384 *** -0.384 *** -0.400 *** -0.386 *** -0.386 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Cons. 3.792 *** 3.479 *** 3.479 *** 3.792 *** 3.477 *** 3.477 ***
(0.087) (0.091) (0.091) (0.087) (0.091) (0.091)
lambda 4.809 *** 1.720 * 1.578 * 4.708 *** 4.625 *** 4.443 ***
(1.313) (0.961) (0.952) (1.285) (1.598) (1.536)
N 34433 29516 29516 34433 29020 29020
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimates with bilateral
stock FDI data from the UNCTAD. Note that we exclude all the negative FDI
values before calculating the centrality.
FDI stock (1) FDI stock (2) FDI stock (3)
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
lnFDI stock 0.156 *** 0.140 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln spl -0.174 *** -0.060 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln gdp o 0.307 *** 0.519 *** 0.267 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln gdp d 0.612 *** 0.696 *** 0.589 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pop o 0.647 *** 0.740 *** 0.626 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pop d 0.644 *** 0.733 *** 0.632 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
contig 0.438 *** 0.372 *** 0.425 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
colony -0.260 *** -0.142 *** -0.254 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
smctry 0.532 *** 0.633 *** 0.496 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
comlang 0.213 *** 0.310 *** 0.218 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln dist -0.463 *** -0.568 *** -0.463 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cons. -7.544 *** -11.400 *** -7.205 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 4810 4810 4810
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Regressions with dist, rta, and ASEAN+China, with the interactions
of CC and spl with dist, rta, and ASEAN +China. The left panel reports the
cases where trade and CC (or spl) are in the same direction. The right panel
reports the cases where trade and CC (or spl) are in the opposite directions.
Note that the network measure of the indirect effects is spl.
dist rta ASEAN + China dist (inv) rta (inv) ASEAN + China (inv)
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -1.899 *** -1.201 *** -1.400 *** -2.460 *** -1.682 *** -1.886 ***
(0.209) (0.207) (0.195) (0.367) (0.279) (0.257)
lnCC 0.702 *** 0.167 *** 0.128 ***
(0.170) (0.021) (0.018)
lnCC inv 0.340 0.198 *** 0.116 ***
(0.275) (0.022) (0.020)
(ln dist)× (lnCC) -0.061 ***
(0.020)
(ln dist)× (lnCC inv) -0.018
(0.031)
ln spl 1.580 *** -0.215 *** -0.144 ***
(0.160) (0.016) (0.016)
ln spl inv 1.054*** -.255 *** -0.243 ***
(0.255) (0.018) (0.017)
(ln dist)× (ln spl) -0.202 ***
(0.018)
(ln dist)× (ln spl inv) -0.147***
(0.029)
rta 1.676*** 1.880 ***
(0.112) (0.136)
rta× (lnCC) -0.022
(0.043)
rta× (lnCC inv) -0.045
(0.051)
rta× (ln spl) 0.339***
(0.042)
rta× (ln spl inv) 0.096 **
(0.049)
ASEAN + China 1.599 *** 1.265 ***
(0.137) (0.135)
(ASEAN + China)× (ln spl) 0.051
(0.048)
(ASEAN + China)× (lnCC) 0.149 **
(0.063)
(ASEAN + China)× (ln spl inv) -0.018
(0.054)
(ASEAN + China)× (lnCC inv) -0.016
(0.066)
ln gdp o 0.929 *** 0.927 *** 0.983 *** 1.166 *** 1.145 *** 1.169 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
ln gdp d 0.817 *** 0.796 *** 0.825 *** 0.595 *** 0.593 *** 0.600 ***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.019) (0.018)
ln pop o 1.041 *** 1.046 *** 1.002 *** 1.095 *** 1.093 *** 1.067 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
ln pop d 0.858 *** 0.856 *** 0.873 *** 0.811 *** 0.815 *** 0.823 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
contig 0.398 *** 0.424 *** 0.343 ** 0.408 * 0.430 ** 0.349 **
(0.136) (0.135) (0.131) (0.231) (0.175) (0.169)
colony 0.544 *** 0.479 *** 0.604 *** 0.644 *** 0.572 *** 0.714 ***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.123) (0.189) (0.142) (0.140)
smctry 0.643 *** 0.554 *** 0.801 ** 0.662 * 0.514 ** 0.794 ***
(0.197) (0.194) (0.191) (0.345) (0.260) (0.254)
comlang 0.704 *** 0.715 *** 0.801 *** 0.730 *** 0.735 *** 0.825 ***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.069) (0.052) (0.051)
Cons. -10.084 *** -15.926 *** -13.867 *** -8.155 *** -14.236 *** -12.089 ***
(1.144) (1.122) (1.055) (2.006) (1.511) (1.398)
trade dummy (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -0.384 *** -0.378 *** -0.384 *** -0.386 *** -0.380 *** -0.386 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Cons. 3.479 *** 3.417 *** 3.479 *** 3.477 *** 3.415 *** 3.477 ***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091)
lambda 1.099 0.607 0.712 4.568 *** 3.435 *** 3.339 ***
(0.981) (0.959) (0.900) (1.679) (1.261) (1.167)
N 29516 29193 29516 29020 28711 29020
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Heckman two step model with sector fixed effects and the interactions of
sector dummies (denoted by 2-digit numbers) with CC and spl. The benchmark
NAICS sector is 21, Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction.
CC spl
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
[sectors]
11 (Agr.) 1.388 *** 1.615 ***
(0.043) (0.061)
22 (Uti.) -0.438 *** -0.161 **
(0.047) (0.066)
31 (Man.1) 2.746 *** 2.899 ***
(0.041) (0.058)
32 (Man.2) 2.732 *** 2.800 ***
(0.041) (0.058)
33 (Man.3) 2.847 *** 2.958 ***
(0.041) (0.057)
lnCC -0.002
(0.051)
ln spl -0.004
(0.017)
[sectors× (lnCC)]
11 (Agr.) -0.141
(0.115)
22 (Uti.) 0.157 *
(0.083)
31 (Man.1) 0.453 ***
(0.067)
32 (Man.2) 0.665 ***
(0.060)
33 (Man.3) 0.771 ***
(0.058)
[sectors× (ln spl)]
11 (Agr.) 0.091 ***
(0.021)
22 (Uti.) -0.047 **
(0.022)
31 (Man.1) -0.268 ***
(0.020)
32 (Man.2) -0.430 ***
(0.020)
33 (Man.3) -0.507 ***
(0.020)
ln gdp o 0.956 *** 0.647 ***
(0.007) (0.011)
ln gdp d 0.715 *** 0.753 ***
(0.007) (0.007)
ln pop o 0.960 *** 0.913 ***
(0.006) (0.006)
ln pop d 0.726 *** 0.764 ***
(0.005) (0.005)
contig 0.878 *** 0.719 ***
(0.079) (0.068)
colony 0.605 *** 0.793 ***
(0.068) (0.061)
smctry 0.677 *** 0.329 ***
(0.113) (0.102)
comlang 0.765 *** 0.692 ***
(0.028) (0.026)
ln dist -2.257 *** -1.494 ***
(0.177) (0.197)
Cons. -11.067 *** -13.830 ***
(0.851) (0.794)
trade dummy (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -0.379 *** -0.341***
(0.004) (0.004)
Cons. 3.048 *** 2.518***
(0.032) (0.035)
lambda 4.819 *** 1.236***
(0.718) (0.834)
N 213031 188935
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A1: Regressions for the baseline model using ln diff to replace ln spl. The
second column reports the case where trade and CC (or diff) are in the same
direction. The third column reports the case where trade and CC (or diff) are
in the opposite directions.
diff diff (inv)
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
lnCC 0.182 ***
(0.016)
lnCC inv 0.223 ***
(0.026)
ln diff 0.175 ***
(0.014)
ln diff inv 0.209***
(0.023)
ln gdp o 0.947 *** 1.166 ***
(0.016) (0.020)
ln gdp d 0.813 *** 0.625 ***
(0.012) (0.026)
ln pop o 1.053 *** 1.102 ***
(0.010) (0.015)
ln pop d 0.863 *** 0.825 ***
(0.009) (0.016)
contig 0.483 *** 0.477 ***
(0.145) (0.254)
colony 0.637 *** 0.751 ***
(0.129) (0.211)
smctry 0.834 *** 0.816 ***
(0.214) (0.382)
comlang 0.801 *** 0.823 ***
(0.047) (0.077)
ln dist -1.649 *** -2.198 ***
(0.214) (0.386)
Cons. -13.309 *** -11.198 ***
(1.167) (2.103)
trade dummy (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -0.384 *** -0.386 ***
(0.010) (0.010)
Cons. 3.479 *** 3.477 ***
(0.091) (0.091)
lambda 2.102 ** 5.069 ***
(0.986) (1.749)
N 29516 29020
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A2: Simultaneous equations model (SEM) with three-stage least-squares
regression. The reduced model is reported.
ln trade (Dep. Var.) lnCC (Dep. Var.)
ln spl -0.218 ***
(0.013)
ln gdp o 0.962 *** 0.499 ***
(0.017) (0.007)
ln gdp d 0.832 *** 0.270 ***
(0.012) (0.006)
ln pop o 1.067 *** 0.236 ***
(0.010) (0.005)
ln pop d 0.877 *** 0.190 ***
(0.009) (0.004)
contig 0.515 *** 0.861 ***
(0.126) (0.065)
colony 0.662 *** 0.516 ***
(0.124) (0.066)
smctry 0.906 *** 0.029
(0.185) (0.097)
comlang 0.821 *** 0.410 ***
(0.046) (0.024)
ln dist -1.237 *** -0.310 ***
(0.021) (0.011)
Cons. -15.862 *** -5.228 ***
(0.303) (0.146)
N 15870 15870
Endogenous variables: ln trade and lnCC; Exogenous variables: ln spl,
ln gdp o, ln gdp d, ln pop o, ln pop d, contig, colony, smctry, comlang, and
ln dist. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Regressions for the baseline models: (1) CC only; (2) spl only; (3)
CC and spl. The left panel reports the cases where trade and CC (or spl) are
in the same direction. The right panel reports the cases where trade and CC
(or spl) are in the opposite directions. Note that the network measure of the
indirect effects is spl, which is computed with α = 0.5 in Equation 1.
Baseline (1) Baseline (2) Baseline (3) Baseline (inv) (1) Baseline (inv) (2) Baseline (inv) (3)
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
lnCC 0.230 *** 0.079 ***
(0.024) (0.018)
lnCC inv 0.276 *** 0.074 ***
(0.023) (0.025)
ln spl -0.563 *** -0.480 ***
(0.028) (0.034)
ln spl inv -0.734 *** -0.655 ***
(0.039) (0.045)
ln gdp o 1.158 *** 0.900 *** 0.897 *** 1.190 *** 1.138 *** 1.135 ***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
ln gdp d 0.832 *** 0.798 *** 0.794 *** 0.773 *** 0.544 *** 0.543 ***
(0.158) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)
ln pop o 1.097 *** 1.044 *** 1.037 *** 1.100 *** 1.091 *** 1.086 ***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
ln pop d 0.862 *** 0.859 *** 0.853 *** 0.845 *** 0.808 *** 0.802 ***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
contig 0.566 *** 0.397 *** 0.378 *** 0.554 *** 0.371 * 0.353 *
(0.214) (0.138) (0.138) (0.210) (0.214) (0.210)
colony 0.536 *** 0.648 *** 0.568 *** 0.501 *** 0.777 *** 0.701 ***
(0.184) (0.124) (0.126) (0.180) (0.174) (0.173)
smctry 1.084 *** 0.807 *** 0.818 *** 1.080 *** 0.771 ** 0.782 **
(0.295) (0.204) (0.202) (0.289) (0.323) (0.316)
comlang 0.837 *** 0.769 *** 0.753 *** 0.825 *** 0.779 *** 0.764 ***
(0.066) (0.047) (0.047) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064)
ln dist -2.115 *** -1.568 *** -1.526 *** -2.084 *** -2.082 *** -2.038 ***
(0.276) (0.205) (0.204) (0.270) (0.326) (0.320)
Cons. -11.694 *** -13.211 *** -13.304 *** -11.659 *** -10.963 *** -11.064 ***
(1.602) (1.116) (1.110) (1.568) (1.774) (1.740)
trade dummy (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -0.400 *** -0.384 *** -0.384 *** -0.400 *** -0.386 *** -0.386 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Cons. 3.792 *** 3.479 *** 4.479 *** 3.792 *** 3.478 *** 3.477 ***
(0.087) (0.091) (0.090) (0.087) (0.091) (0.091)
lambda 4.808 *** 1.523 1.444 4.708 *** 4.278 *** 4.195 ***
(1.313) (0.948) (0.944) (1.285) (1.478) (1.450)
N 34433 29516 29516 34433 29020 29020
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Regressions with dist, rta, and ASEAN + China, with the inter-
actions of CC and spl with dist, rta, and ASEAN + China. The left panel
reports the cases where trade and CC (or spl) are in the same direction. The
right panel reports the cases where trade and CC (or spl) are in the opposite
directions. Note that the network measure of the indirect effects is spl, which
is computed with α = 0.5 in Equation 1.
dist rta ASEAN + China dist (inv) rta (inv) ASEAN + China (inv)
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -1.726 *** -1.168 *** -1.381 *** -2.353 *** -1.651 *** -1.855 ***
(0.206) (0.206) (0.194) (0.351) (0.269) (0.251)
lnCC 1.027 *** 0.140 *** 0.111 ***
(0.183) (0.021) (0.019)
lnCC inv 0.376 0.145 *** 0.063 ***
(0.284) (0.022) (0.020)
(ln dist)× (lnCC) -0.101 ***
(0.021)
(ln dist)× (lnCC inv) -0.028
(0.032)
ln spl 3.709 *** -0.508 *** -0.342 ***
(0.340) (0.035) (0.035)
ln spl inv 2.070 *** -0.674 *** -0.651 ***
(0.521) (0.037) (0.037)
(ln dist)× (ln spl) -0.476 ***
(0.038)
(ln dist)× (ln spl inv) -0.310 ***
(0.058)
rta 1.557 *** 1.711 ***
(0.096) (0.115)
rta× (lnCC) 0.047
(0.047)
rta× (lnCC inv) 0.008
(0.055)
rta× (ln spl) 0.814 ***
(0.092)
rta× (ln spl inv) 0.120
(0.105)
ASEAN + China 1.437 *** 1.253 ***
(0.124) (0.114)
(ASEAN + China)× (ln spl) -0.024
(0.109)
(ASEAN + China)× (lnCC) 0.105
(0.067)
(ASEAN + China)× (ln spl inv) -0.025
(0.067)
(ASEAN + China)× (lnCC inv) -0.066
(0.114)
ln gdp o 0.902 *** 0.902 *** 0.962 *** 1.140 *** 1.122 *** 1.143 ***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
ln gdp d 0.804 *** 0.784 *** 0.813 *** 0.542 *** 0.543 *** 0.548 ***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019)
ln pop o 1.030 *** 1.036 *** (0.995 *** 1.082 *** 1.081 *** 1.054 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
ln pop d 0.851 *** 0.849 *** 0.866 *** 0.795 *** 0.800 *** 0.807 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
contig 0.411 *** 0.417 *** 0.331 ** 0.419 * 0.423 ** 0.324 **
(0.133) (0.134) (0.131) (0.219) (0.169) (0.165)
colony 0.555 *** 0.486 *** 0.606 *** 0.678 *** 0.610 *** 0.744 ***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.123) (0.179) (0.139) (0.138)
smctry 0.642 *** 0.531 *** 0.802 *** 0.664 ** 0.498 ** 0.789 ***
(0.193) (0.193) (0.190) (0.328) (0.251) (0.247)
comlang 0.670 *** 0.688 *** 0.779 *** 0.692 *** 0.702 *** 0.789 ***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.066) (0.051) (0.051)
Cons. -10.848 *** -15.675 *** -13.607 *** -8.276 *** -13.711 *** -11.530 ***
(1.126) (1.116) (1.050) (1.916) (1.460) (1.362)
trade dummy (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -0.384 *** -0.378 *** -0.384 *** -0.386 *** -0.380 *** -0.386 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Cons. 3.479 *** 3.418 *** 3.479 *** 4.478 *** 3.415 *** 3.478 ***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091)
lambda 0.637 0.417 0.586 4.341 *** 3.189 *** 3.092 ***
(0.964) (0.953) (0.897) (1.600) (1.218) (1.138)
N 29516 29193 29516 29020 28711 29020
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Regressions for the baseline models and for the specifications with
the interactions of cmb with dist, rta, and ASEAN + China. Note that the
network measure of the indirect effects is cmb.
Baseline dist rta ASEAN + China
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
ln cmd 0.852 *** -1.432 *** 0.839 *** 0.811 ***
(0.042) (0.225) (0.029) (0.033)
ln dist -2.234 *** -1.739 *** -1.768 *** -2.064 ***
(0.284) (0.246) (0.205) (0.223)
(ln dist)× (ln cmd) 0.269 ***
(0.026)
rta 0.110
(0.082)
ASEAN + China 1.771 ***
(0.117)
rta× (ln cmd) -0.690 ***
(0.059)
(ASEAN + China)× (ln cmd) 0.372 ***
(0.080)
ln gdp o 0.950 *** 0.960 *** 0.976 *** 0.969 ***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
ln gdp d 0.581 *** 0.589 *** 0.605 *** 0.587 ***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
ln pop o 0.973 *** 0.971 *** 0.993 *** 0.941 ***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
ln pop d 0.726 *** 0.724 *** 0.745 *** 0.732 ***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
contig 0.665 *** 0.754 *** 0.610 *** 0.628 ***
(0.222) (0.189) (0.154) (0.173)
colony 0.898 *** 0.966 *** 0.889 *** 0.945 ***
(0.189) (0.162) (0.129) (0.148)
smctry 0.976 *** 0.763 *** 0.557 *** 0.971 ***
(0.305) (0.262) (0.210) (0.238)
comlang 0.799 *** 0.736 *** 0.749 *** 0.821 ***
(0.068) (0.059) (0.047) (0.053)
Cons. -4.511 *** -8.249 *** -8.376 *** -5.077 ***
(1.694) (1.483) (1.220) (1.324)
trade dummy (Dep. Var.)
ln dist -0.400 *** -0.400 *** -0.395 *** -0.400 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Cons. 3.792 *** 3.792 *** 3.732 *** 3.792 ***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
lambda 4.976 *** 4.252 *** 3.392 *** 3.888 ***
(1.355) (1.158) (0.969) (1.062)
N 34433 34433 33991 34433
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
29
Table A6: Diagnostic checks using the baseline models: (1) CC only; (2) spl
only; (3) CC and spl. OLS, Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) and
zero inflated Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (ZIPPML) are used. The
network measure of the indirect effects is spl.
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) PPML (1) PPML (2) PPML (3) ZIPPML (1) ZIPPML (2) ZIPPML (3)
ln trade (Dep. Var.)
lnCC 0.237 *** 0.104 *** 0.086 *** 0.114 *** 0.089 *** 0.119 ***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln spl -0.253 *** -0.205 *** -0.079 *** 0.024 *** -0.078 *** 0.030 ***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln gdp o 1.160 *** 0.932 *** 0.922 *** 0.616 *** 0.614 *** 0.564 *** 0.601 *** 0.610 *** 0.557 ***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln gdp d 0.836 *** 0.818 *** 0.809 *** 0.742 *** 0.756 *** 0.732 *** 0.731 *** 0.751 *** 0.724 ***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pop o 1.093 *** 1.058 *** 1.046 *** 0.793 *** 0.790 *** 0.768 *** 0.783 *** 0.786 *** 0.762 ***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln pop d 0.858 *** 0.869 *** 0.860 *** 0.754 *** 0.767 *** 0.741 *** 0.745 *** 0.762 *** 0.735 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
contig 0.789 *** 0.503 *** 0.466 *** 0.428 *** 0.434 *** 0.441 *** 0.435 *** 0.439 *** 0.447 ***
(0.117) (0.126) (0.126) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
colony 0.519 *** 0.677 *** 0.566 *** -0.164 *** -0.119 *** -0.177 *** -0.170 *** -0.122 *** -0.183 ***
(0.121) (0.124) (0.125) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
smctry 1.322 *** 0.899 *** 0.906 *** 0.751 *** 0.683 *** 0.714 *** 0.723 *** 0.667 *** 0.697 ***
(0.160) (0.185) (0.185) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
comlang 0.844 *** 0.810 *** 0.782 *** 0.249 *** 0.303 *** 0.240 *** 0.256 *** 0.309 *** 0.244 ***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln dist -1.123 *** -1.240 *** -1.204 *** -0.567 *** -0.596 *** -0.554 *** -0.565 *** -0.595 *** -0.551 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cons. -17.209 *** -15.558 *** -15.440 *** -11.850 *** -11.900 *** -11.060 *** -11.450 *** -11.710 *** -10.800 ***
(0.272) (0.303) (0.304) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
trade dummy (Dep. Var.)
Cons. -7.375 *** -8.654 *** -8.656 ***
(0.177) (0.267) (0.267)
ln dist 0.752 *** 0.827 *** 0.828 ***
(0.020) (0.030) (0.030)
N 20776 15858 15858 30779 20126 20126 30779 20126 20126
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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